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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                        
No. 04-3193
                        
PHOENIX LITHOGRAPHING CORP.,
                                                     Appellant
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PRESTIGE ASSOCIATES, INC.
                         
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-01485)
District Judge:  Honorable Mary Little Cooper
                        
Argued June 29, 2005
Before: ROTH, RENDELL, and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Filed August 5, 2005)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
On appeal, Phoenix Lithographing Corp. urges us to reverse the District Court’s
order imposing the burden of proof on Phoenix to demonstrate its continuing lien interest
in the machine at issue, notwithstanding its transfer.  We agree with the District Court’s
ruling and will therefore affirm.
As we write essentially for the parties, our discussion of the facts will be
abbreviated.  
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In 1997, PNC obtained an undisputed perfected security interest in a die cutter (the
“Die Cutter”) belonging to Taconic Corporation.   The security agreement between PNC
and Taconic contained a provision which prohibited Taconic from disposing of collateral,
except inventory, with limited exceptions:
4.3  Disposition of Collateral.   Borrower will safeguard and
protect all Collateral for Agent’s general account and make no
disposition thereof whether by sale, lease, or otherwise except
(a) the sale of Inventory . . . and (b) the disposition or transfer
of Equipment in the ordinary course of business during any
fiscal year having an aggregate fair market value of not more
than $250,000 and only to the extent that (i) the proceeds of
any such disposition are used to acquire replacement
Equipment which is subject to Agent’s first priority security
interest or (ii) the proceeds of which are remitted to Agent to
be applied pursuant to Section 2.11.
In October 2000, Prestige Associates, Inc., obtained the Die Cutter from Taconic
in exchange for $75,000 in credit against invoices for work performed by Prestige for a
third party, Inter Omni.  Thereafter, in June 2002, Phoenix acquired PNC’s lien on and
rights in the Die Cutter.  
Thereafter, Phoenix filed a complaint against Prestige asserting its superior right to
the Die Cutter, alleging that PNC had a perfected lien on the Die Cutter by virtue of its
UCC-1 filing and that “Taconic had transferred  possession of the Die Cutter [to Prestige]
without PNC’s consent and subject to PNC’s perfected security interest.” (Complaint,
Apx. 25)  Phoenix therefore claimed rights in the Die Cutter superior to those of Prestige
and claimed entitlement to immediate possession of the Die Cutter.  In  response, Prestige
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denied the allegation as to the effect of the lien, and asserted in its Sixth Affirmative
Defense, that “PNC released its lien on the Die Cutter prior to defendant’s purchase of
same.”  (Apx. 40)
Both parties moved for summary judgment and the Court characterized the issue
before it as follows:
Here, the parties agree that whether Phoenix has a right to
possess the Die Cutter turns initially on one issue:  the effect
of the October 2000 sale on PNC’s security interest in the Die
Cutter . . .  If PNC’s rights to the Die Cutter were
extinguished by the October 2000 sale, Phoenix cannot
prevail at trial.   If PNC’s rights survived the October 2000
sale, then Phoenix may be able to proceed on its theories of
recovery.  (Apx. 5-6)
The Court concluded:   
Defendant asserts that the record is devoid of any evidence
that these three conditions [that the sale was in the ordinary
course of business, that the equipment had fair market value
of not more than $250,000, and that the sale proceeds be used
to purchase replacement equipment or be remitted to creditor]
were not satisfied, and therefore it is entitled to summary
judgment because no reasonably jury could conclude that the
same was not authorized.   We agree.  (Apx. 8)
In a footnote to this statement, the District Court stated:
We recognize the incongruity of speaking in terms of
evidence from which a jury could conclude that something did
not happen.   Nevertheless, at trial Phoenix would have the
burden of proving its right to possess the Die Cutter, and one
step in that chain is proof that PNC did not lose the security
interest in the Die Cutter by virtue of the October 2000 sale.
(fn. 2, Apx. 8)
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On appeal, Phoenix urges that Prestige had the burden to adduce evidence, by way
of its affirmative defense, that the sale was free and clear of liens.   It also asserts that the
District Court erred in holding that there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury
could conclude that the sale of the collateral was not in the ordinary course of business.
The standard of review in an appeal from an order resolving cross-motions for
summary judgment is plenary.  Cantor v. Perelman, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13977, at *7
(3d Cir. July 12, 2005) (citing Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Racho
Trucking Co., 897 F.2d 1248, 1252 (3d Cir. 1990)).  This Court applies the test provided
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c): (a) is there no genuine issue of material fact,
and (b) is one party entitled to judgment as a matter of law?  Id.
We begin with the basic premise that we believe to be important here:  that is, that
in order for its suit to succeed, Phoenix had to show its right to possession by proving that
PNC’s security interest in the Die Cutter, the basis for its rights to the equipment, had
continued notwithstanding the sale.  Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that
Phoenix had to prove that the sale was not authorized.  See,e.g., Whirlpool Financial
Corp. v. Mercantile Business Credit, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1256, 1264 (E.D. Mo. 1995). 
Section 9-306 of the Uniform Commercial Code is controlling:  
9-306(ii).  Except where this article otherwise provides, a
security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding the
sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the
disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security
agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable
proceeds . . .
     There is no contention that the $250,000 limit was relevant here.1
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By virtue of this provision, in order to prove that PNC’s interest and, accordingly,
Phoenix’s interest, “continued in the collateral notwithstanding sale,” Phoenix had to
prove, affirmatively, that the disposition was not authorized by the secured party in the
security agreement.  Here, the only way it could prove that was by showing that the
conditions set forth whereby the sale would be authorized (namely, the exception to the
general prohibition against disposition) had not been met.  
As indicated above, the security agreement authorized sales if they were in the
ordinary course of business and proceeds were used to acquire replacement equipment or
proceeds were remitted to the Agent to be applied against the amount due.    The latter1
element need not detain us long, for there was absolutely no proof offered by Phoenix as
to the application or receipt of sales proceeds.   Accordingly, we need not decide whether
the sale of the Die Cutter was “in the ordinary course of business” because the security
agreement required both a sale in the ordinary course and that proceeds were reinvested in
Equipment or given to the Agent.  Here, because there was no proof about what was done – or
not done – with the proceeds, it makes no difference whether the sale was or was not in the
ordinary course, inasmuch as the second requirement has not been proven.  
Phoenix relies on Rushmore State Bank v. Kurylas, 424 N.W.2d 649 (S.D. 1988)
for the proposition that imposing conditions on sales is tantamount to the creation of
secret liens.  However, its reliance on that case is misplaced, because the facts there were
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different.  There, the security agreement permitted a disposition without qualification or
limitation, but then stated that the purchaser would not be relieved of the obligations
under the relevant agreement.  Thus, authorization to transfer was clearly given, but a
condition was imposed upon the transferee.
Here, the authorization is not effective unless the conditions have been met.   The
security agreement here does not have a “conditional authorization.”   Rather, it contains
a provision whereby the authorization to transfer exists only if certain things happen. 
There is no secret condition imposed on the transferee. Thus, Rushmore is of no aid to
Phoenix.  
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that Phoenix failed to meet its
burden of proof, and the order of the District Court will be AFFIRMED.
____________________
